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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Constitutions have two major functions. They determine the structure 
and functioning of the institutions of public authority, and they 
regulate the relationship between that authority and its subjects. The 
crisis of European constitutionalism is primarily about the second of 
these functions. The EU has not made the connection with citizens 
that is necessary for a satisfying level of legitimacy and for confidence 
about its future. Citizens remain distinctly half-hearted in their 
acceptance of and enthusiasm for the EU. One might speak of a ‘crisis 
of commitment’. 
Overcoming this crisis entails improving the EU-citizen bond. 
However, this is a complex process. A distinctive aspect of the EU-
citizen relationship is that it is not independent of the parallel 
relationships found within the Member States. The degree and nature 
of the bond between citizen and EU is influenced by the degree and 
nature of the bond between citizen and state, sometimes in intricate 
and indirect ways. The EU cannot work on its relationships in 
isolation. 
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The most obvious response to this situation might be for the EU to try 
to improve feeling on all sides of the EU-citizen-national government 
triangle, to strengthen the governmental system of Europe generally. 
However, less generous and more cynical tactics may also appeal. 
Pushing the citizen closer to the EU might be achieved by pulling the 
citizen further away from the state. The EU might seek to undermine 
the citizen-state relationship in order to create a constitutional space 
that it can occupy. To win the citizen away, it might humiliate the 
state. If the parallel EU and national citizenships are seen in 
competition, with citizens having a limited fund of loyalty or 
commitment, such an approach would make sense. 
No European institution or servant would admit to this method, of 
course. However, the EU’s most profound constitutional acts and 
effects to date may be seen in this light: what they amount to 
collectively is a systematic and challenging intervention in the citizen-
state relationship, and implicitly and indirectly also in the citizen-
citizen relationship. Repeatedly and consistently, the EU, in particular 
its Court of Justice, diminishes the power, status, and capacity of the 
states in the eyes of its citizens, as if to say ‘See? The state cannot 
look after you any more. You need the EU’. This chapter looks at 
three situations that are examples of this. Firstly, the specialness of 
national citizenship is examined, and the way in which the law, in the 
hands of the Court, takes this specialness away. The assimilation of 
migrant EU citizens to nationals means that our claim to a unique and 
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preferential relationship with our state is almost destroyed. If our own 
state cannot prize us above others, what then is the basis of our loyalty 
to it? Secondly, the Court has reduced the respect that national laws 
traditionally require us to accord public institutions. We have, thanks 
to EU law, greater rights to stand up to national laws and bodies that 
deny us our preferences. Is this elevation of the individual an 
inducement to contempt for the state? Thirdly, the Court and the law 
tell us that we do not have to be part of our state and its systems. The 
national community of fate becomes a community of voluntary 
membership. We may go wherever we like, and join the state of our 
choice. Are citizens to become increasingly picky customers in a 
marketplace for nations, asking not what we can offer our country but 
what each country can offer us? 
2. Second-class citizens 
Rights for migrants 
Where the EU speaks to individuals, it does so initially, and most 
fundamentally, if they are migrants. What the Court of Justice 
describes as the ‘fundamental freedoms’ of the Treaties are rights 
awarded to those who engage in cross-border activities, and in 
particular to those who travel to or live in states other than their state 
of nationality.
1
 These individuals are granted the rights to live, work, 
                                                 
1 See e.g. most recently ECJ, Case C-151/07 Theologos-Grigorios Chatzithanasis v. 
Ypourgos Ygeias kai Koinonikis Allilengyis and Organismos Epangelmatikis Ekpaidefsis kai 
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and study in their host state, to be treated equally to nationals, and to 
bring their families with them.
2
 
These are rights of great importance to those who benefit from them, 
but they continue to be exercised by a relatively small group of 
people. Moreover, they do not at first glance seem to threaten the 
established constitutional order or the special status of the national 
citizen. Firstly, the most basic of citizenship rights, the right to vote in 
national elections, is not included, nor are sensitive functions such as 
those in the military or official positions.
3
 The citizen is still 
demarcated as a person possessing exclusive local privileges. 
Secondly, there is no natural constitutional objection to noblesse 
oblige. Extending hospitality to a guest, treating him or her as you 
would your own family, does not in itself pose a threat to the 
relationships within that family, at least as long as there are not too 
many guests staying for too long a period – which in the case of free 
movement is not yet the situation. 
In fact, insofar as citizen loyalty depends upon a perception of the 
                                                                                                                   
Katartisis (OEEK) [2008] ECR NYP; ECJ, Case C-158/07 Jacqueline Förster v. 
Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep [2008] ECR NYP; ECJ, Case C-127/08 Blaise 
Baheten Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] ECR I-
6241. 
2 See Arts. 12, 17, 18, 39 EC; Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union 
and their families to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] 
OJ L 158/77 of 30 April 2004. 
3 Art. 19 EC; Art. 39(4) EC; ECJ, Case 149/79 Commission v. Belgium [1980] ECR 
3881; O’Keeffe, ‘Judicial interpretation of the public service exception to the free movement 
of workers’, in D. Curtin and D. O’Keeffe, eds., Constitutional Adjudication in European 
Community and National Law (Dublin, Butterworths 1992) p. 89. 
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state as benevolent and protective, this image may well be protected 
by generous and equal treatment of the outsider. Just as the argument 
‘it may be me tomorrow’ is used as a reason to object to the 
persecution of others, the perception that all persons within the state 
are well treated may be comforting even to the individual who does 
not yet feel in any sense excluded. It is evidence of the decency of 
public authority. 
A simple assimilatory reading of free movement rights does not 
therefore undermine the citizen-state bond. It may require some 
adaption of the national legal order, but this adaption need not be 
experienced by either citizen or state as threatening the essence of 
their relationship to each other. 
Substantive equality and beyond 
The assimilatory reading mentioned above assumed that equality 
entails identical treatment. The foreigner is granted the right to do as 
the locals do and to be treated as they are treated. However, uniform 
treatment can in fact lead to a systematic disadvantaging of some 
groups, and in the case of free movement this is true for foreigners. 
The standards and requirements that national rules embody are 
typically based upon local norms and habits, and so are either harder 
for foreigners to meet, or they impose unreasonable demands upon 
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them.
4
 Hence where a rule, even one formally blind to nationality, in 
fact works to exclude the foreigner, EU law demands that it be 
questioned. Is it based on objectively justifiable criteria? If so, the 
exclusionary effect may have to be accepted.
5
 For example, a rule that 
schoolteachers must speak the local language puts millions of 
potential migrant workers at a disadvantage, but is nevertheless 
obviously perfectly sensible.
6
 The language criterion is justifiable for 
the function rather than a proxy for nationality. By contrast, a 
language criterion for some other functions – for example a university 
researcher in international law – might not have sufficient 
justification, from which the rational conclusion would be that it was 
simply a way of indirectly excluding foreigners. 
The right of EU migrants to equal treatment entails a prohibition on 
indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality, as well as on direct, 
or explicit, discrimination.7 This indirect discrimination ban can have 
surprising effects, as in Garcia Avello v. Belgian State.
8
 In this 
instance, a Spanish-Belgian couple wished to register their children in 
Belgium with the name Garcia Weber, derived from the surnames of 
the father and the mother combined, as is the Spanish custom, and as 
the children were already registered with the Spanish authorities. The 
                                                 
4 G. Davies, Nationality Discrimination in the European Internal Market (The 
Hague, Kluwer Law International 2003) p. 43-44. 
5 ECJ, Case C-237/94 John O'Flynn v. Adjudication Officer [1996] ECR I-2617. 
6 ECJ, Case 379/87 Anita Groener v. Minister for Education and the City of Dublin 
Vocational Educational Committee [1989] ECR 3967. 
7 See supra n. 5. 
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children had dual nationality. However, the situation was complicated 
by the fact that the children’s birth certificates bore the surname of 
their father, Garcia Avello, as Belgian law provided that Belgian 
children must take the name of their father – subject to certain 
exceptions not relevant here. The couple was therefore asking for their 
children’s Belgian names to be changed to match their Spanish names. 
As well as having the rule that children take their father’s name, 
Belgian law frowned upon name changes, allowing them only in 
exceptional circumstances. 
It is therefore unsurprising that the Belgian authorities refused the 
request. However, Mr. Garcia Avello, the Spanish half of the couple, 
claimed that this amounted to indirect discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, from which as a migrant European citizen he was entitled 
to protection. He relied on Art. 17 EC, which declares EU citizenship 
to be possessed by all citizens of the Member States, and on Art. 12 
EC, which prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality, and 
applies to all situations falling within EC law.
9
 
The Court agreed with Mr. Garcia Avello that the Belgian practice 
amounted to prohibited discrimination on the basis of nationality. The 
                                                                                                                   
8 ECJ, Case C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v. Belgian State [2003] ECR I-11613. 
9 Art. 17 provides that ‘(1) Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every 
person holding the nationality of member state shall be a citizen of the union. Citizenship of 
the union shall complement and not replace national citizenship. (2) Citizens of the union 
shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall be subject to the duties imposed 
thereby’. Art. 12 provides ‘within the scope of application of this Treaty and without 
prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of 
nationality shall be prohibited….’ 
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Belgian rules clearly created particular disadvantages for those 
Belgians who were also Spanish, and there was no adequate 
justification. The judgment turned on the principle of the 
‘immutability’ of surnames, since it was in fact a name change that 
was being requested. The Belgian state claimed that such immutability 
was an essential principle of social order, which prevented confusion 
about identity. They also argued that the rule that children take their 
father’s name served a similar function, and allowing the change 
requested would undermine this and create confusion about their 
paternity. The Court did not address this argument as such but 
implicitly rejected it. 
For the Garcia Avello-Weber family, this was a welcome judgment, 
but there will be few people in their position. For most Belgians, the 
position is entirely unchanged. Yet this is precisely the significance of 
the case. This judgment divides Belgians into groups with different 
rights: those with dual nationality, such as the Avello-Weber children, 
who can use EU law to assert particular naming rights, and others, 
who cannot, and must take only their father’s name. 
The arguments for the necessity of the patrilineal naming practice, and 
for the importance of immutable names, border on the laughable – 
although the Advocate General was notably careful to treat them with 
apparent respect even while he dismissed them.
10
 It is clearly not the 
                                                 
10 See Advocate General Jacobs in Garcia Avello, supra n. 8, paras. 70-75. 
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case that the Belgian social order would collapse if parents could 
choose whether children took their father’s or their mother’s name, or 
even a combination. Nor would Belgian integrity be directly 
threatened by more flexibility concerning name changes. As the 
Advocate General indicated, many lands are quite flexible about such 
things and without obvious consequences.
11
 Yet another part of the 
case hints at a different kind of reason for the Belgian intransigence. 
According to Belgian law, Belgians with dual nationality were treated, 
within Belgium, as exclusively Belgian. In general, no account could 
be taken of their other nationality. 
Such a rule is really one of equality. All Belgians are to be treated 
alike by the Belgian state. It is a classical republican approach to the 
equality of citizens, in which the state is blind to the differences 
between them.
12
 In many ways, this protects religious or racial or 
other minorities, who cannot be in any way explicitly singled out or 
diminished. However, as the case shows, it can in fact work indirectly 
to disadvantage such groups, by making the state unable to take into 
account their particular and atypical circumstances. Most Belgians 
experience no discomfort with respect to the naming rules. Those who 
may have real practical problems because of dual nationality find that 
                                                 
11 Ibid., paras. 6-18, and paras. 70-75. 
12 See e.g. E.T. Beller, ‘The Headscarf Affair: The Conseil d’Etat on the Role of 
Religion and Culture in French Society’, 39 Tex. Int’l L.J. (2004) p. 581; T. Jeremy Gunn, 
‘Religious Freedom and Laïcité: A Comparison of the United States and France’, BYU Law 
Review (2004) p. 419; M. Mahlmann, ‘Religious Tolerance, Pluralist Society and the 
Neutrality of the State: The Federal Constitutional Court’s Decision in the Headscarf Case’, 4 
GLJ (2003) p. 1099. 
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the state is deaf to them, as a matter of principle. 
The rule therefore appears to limit the capacity of the state to respond 
intelligently to the life circumstances of its citizens, and from the most 
immediate policy perspectives is just silly. Its justification, however, 
lies in a broader conception of society as one in which divisions 
between citizens attack the very heart of a cohesive social order, and a 
state that may target its acts towards specific groups is a threat to 
individual liberty. Many states have naming rules similar to those of 
Belgium,
13
 and there are many other apparently pointlessly strict and 
formalistic administrative rules that serve the same goal of creating 
uniformity as such.
14
 The traditional European concept of citizenship 
is closer to the Belgian one, in which the uniqueness of individual 
citizens is ignored, rather than to the Court of Justice’s demand that 
such uniqueness be respected. 
One might therefore say, perhaps with some dramatic licence, that the 
Court in Garcia Avello takes a step towards reversing the French 
Revolution – one of the sources of the traditional notion of citizenship 
– and introducing a different concept of national membership, in 
which the state is obliged to treat each individual on his or her own 
terms insofar as this is practically possible. However, within the 
current state of the law, individuals who can assert that right to 
                                                 
13 See supra n. 10. 
14 G. Davies, ‘Bureaucracy and free movement: A conflict of form and substance’, 
NtEr (2003) p. 81. 
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individual treatment are only those with a cross-border connection. 
Mr. Garcia Avello benefits, and so can any other Belgian with a 
special connection to another country and who finds that personalised 
treatment would be more to his or her taste. However, those Belgians 
who stay at home and have no such argument become a second-class 
group. They may also find the law an ass at times, but because their 
problems are not connected with EU law they have no status to object. 
The facts in Garcia Avello are unusual, and more commonly it is a 
non-national that objects to local law. It is also often the case that the 
question of discrimination is not raised. The Treaty does protect 
migrants from discrimination, but it also grants them rights to work 
and live in other states, and the simplest objection to national law is 
that it obstructs the exercise of these rights. A national measure that 
does this is contrary to the Treaty unless it can be shown to be 
necessary for a specific legitimate goal.
15
 
Migrants objecting to national laws on the grounds that they obstruct 
free movement have led to judgments as divisive and quietly radical 
as Garcia Avello. Consider, for example, the astonishing 
Vlassopoulou.
16
 This case concerned a Greek lawyer who moved to 
                                                 
15 See ECJ, Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2002] ECR I-7091; ECJ, Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de 
football association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v. Jean-Marc 
Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v. Jean-
Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921. 
16 ECJ, Case 340/89 Vlassopoulou v. Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- und 
Europaangelegenheiten Baden-Württemberg [1991] ECR 2357. 
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Germany, obtained a doctorate (in German, on German law, magna 
cum laude), and began to work for a German law firm. She specialised 
in Greek and European law, and whenever German law was involved 
she worked under the supervision of a German lawyer. 
Five years after starting this job, and ten years after coming to 
Germany, she applied to the German legal authorities to be entered on 
the register of German lawyers.  She was refused, however, because 
she did not have the required qualifications – an undergraduate degree 
in German law. She claimed that this refusal hindered her freedom of 
establishment, and was contrary to EU law. 
The Court agreed. It found that the obligation to allow foreign 
nationals to establish themselves as, for example, lawyers meant that 
the German authorities had to take a different approach. They should 
have first looked at the qualifications Ms Vlassopoulou had obtained 
in Greece to see how much overlap there was with local qualifications. 
That would have been considerable, since modern Greek law is based 
on German law. Then they should have looked at her other 
qualifications, such as the PhD, to see what knowledge she had 
obtained. Subsequently, they should have taken into account the 
experience she had acquired in practice as well as the knowledge she 
was likely to have gained from this, before making an overall 
assessment of whether her level of knowledge of German law was up 
to that of a newly minted German graduate, or whether there were 
specific gaps, which it was then reasonable to ask her to fill by means 
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of a period of supervised work or perhaps an exam. The word was not 
used, perhaps because the case is not very recent, but if it were being 
decided now, the Court would undoubtedly say that the simple 
rejection of Ms Vlassopoulou’s application was disproportionate. 
If the only question were whether Ms Vlassopoulou was fit to 
practice, then this was a very sensible approach. No-one who has 
taught at a university can doubt that after her various experiences Ms 
Vlassopoulou will have been far better able to practice than the 
average new graduate, not only with a better knowledge and 
understanding of German law but also with a better understanding and 
insight into her own gaps in knowledge. She will have been a less 
dangerous lawyer than the graduate who may be under the illusion 
that he or she has at last a thorough grasp of the system. 
However, consider the position of a German citizen who, as a result of 
various experiences, has picked up an impressive knowledge of law. 
Would he or she be able to excuse him- or herself from professional 
training? Could it be argued that a degree in dentistry provides an 
understanding of the obligations of professional work, a cum laude 
graduation demonstrates intelligence, and a PhD in orthodontics and 
patient satisfaction has given a good knowledge of tort law, while ten 
years working as an advisor to personal injury lawyers means that he 
or she now has as solid a grasp of the local law and legal system as a 
fresh graduate? On the facts, such an argument may be convincing, 
but it would probably not be accepted. Even a less far-fetched case, 
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one more similar to Ms Vlassopoulou’s, would be unlikely to succeed. 
If a German citizen had studied philosophy before doing a doctorate in 
law and then serving as a legal advisor for years, he or she would still 
have a request for registration as a lawyer rejected on the grounds that 
he or she did not have a law degree. 
There are good reasons of practice and principle for states to expect 
citizens to adapt and conform to rules in many areas, even if these 
rules are sometimes under- or over-inclusive and make the atypical 
citizen jump through apparently unnecessary hoops. Rules are clear 
and transparent, and as a result give confidence to the public and 
authority to those who conform to them, while minimising disputes. 
There would be a number of practical and legal problems if the bar 
were open to all those who could provide objective evidence of legal 
knowledge. States require specific qualifications in order to avoid the 
problems of policing and uncertainty associated with such an open-
ended approach. Yet it now seems that the position has changed for 
migrants. Where they are concerned, by contrast, it is for the state to 
adapt to their personal circumstances. Unlike locals, migrants can 
state the facts of their position and expect local rules to fit around 
them. 
This undermines one of the most fundamental elements of citizenship: 
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the notion that one is a member of the most privileged legal group.
17
 It 
is often said that citizenship cannot accommodate the idea of the 
second-class citizen – everyone must be equal. Garcia Avello 
confronts this. A fortiori, the citizen must not be worse off than the 
non-citizen, or the essential promise that citizenship contains – you 
are the person that the state exists to serve – is made hollow. One may 
see citizenship as containing a ‘most favoured person’ guarantee. 
Vlassopoulou nullifies this guarantee, as do other cases that grant 
substantive rights to non-citizens and that go beyond formal equality, 
giving them extra rights. 
The citizenship directive is in fact the greatest source of such 
nullification. The primary example is the promise that non-citizens 
may bring their families to live with them, whatever the nationality of 
those family members.
18
 The Belgian in Denmark may bring his or her 
non-European partner and children to Denmark without further ado, 
while the Dane has to comply with Danish immigration rules, which 
may make such immigration difficult or impossible.
19
 The migrant is 
again elevated to a super-class of local society. 
The Court has been challenged on this by litigants claiming that this 
creation of ‘reverse discrimination’ against locals is in conflict with 
                                                 
17 G. Davies, Services, citizenship and the country of origin principle, University of 
Edinburgh, Edinburgh Europa Institute, Mitchell Working Paper 2/2007, available at SSRN:  
< http://ssrn.com/abstract=1007728> (accessed 6/11/2009). 
18 Directive 2004/38, see supra n. 2, Art. 7(2). 
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the allegiance to the equality of Europeans that Art. 12 apparently 
professes.
20
 If discrimination is prohibited, how can migrants be 
accorded privileged treatment that locals are denied? The Court has 
consistently accepted that such discrimination does result, but claims 
that it is not responsible and therefore cannot remedy the situation. 
The discrimination, it says, is the result of Member States who do not 
grant their own citizens rights of the same quality and scope as EU 
law grants to migrants. If Germany offered a universally flexible 
approach to qualifications, or allowed its own citizens to bring their 
families to live with them, then there would be no such 
disadvantaging. The discrimination is the work of the Member States, 
and only they can remedy it.21 
This approach is legally impeccable inasmuch as if the Court were to 
grant rights to locals as well, it would be rewriting the Treaty and 
extending its own jurisdiction.
22
 There is a constitutional basis that it 
relies upon for the division of competences. However, it is clearly 
problematic in its outcome. On the one hand, EU law turns stay-at-
home citizens into second-class members of society, and elevates 
foreigners and locals who engage in international activities – 
                                                                                                                   
19 ECJ, Case C-64 and 65/96 Uecker and Jacquet v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1997] 
ECR I-3171; ECJ, Cases 35 and 36/82 Morson and Jhanjan v. Netherlands [1982] ECR 3723. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 C. Ritter, ‘Purely internal situations, reverse discrimination, Guimont, Dzodzi and 
Art. 234’, 31 E. L. Rev. (2006) p. 690; G. Davies, Nationality Discrimination in the European 
Internal Market (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 2003) pp. 117-144. 
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cosmopolitans – to a special status.
23
 On the other hand, it portrays the 
state as the failing party, the one that regulates irrationally, fails to 
respect equality, and chooses not to protect its citizens. It divides and 
then humiliates, which is the subject of the next two sections. 
A remedy worse than the disease? 
The exclusion of locals from the fundamental freedoms is a result of 
them finding themselves in a ‘wholly internal’ situation.
24
 EU law 
grants rights to those who migrate or who engage in cross-border 
activities. Those who do neither, and whose situation encompasses 
facts and circumstances wholly within one state, simply fall outside 
EU jurisdiction.
25
 The EU is not generally attributed responsibility for 
all law but simply to matters involving more than one state. 
The Court adheres to this principle, but in recent years it has narrowed 
the scope of the exclusion in practice.
26
 It has become easier to find a 
cross-border element within a situation that is sufficient to bring it 
within EU law. For example, in Carpenter the Court accepted that the 
presence of Mr. Carpenter’s non-European wife in the UK made it 
easier for him to travel throughout the EU for his business, since there 
                                                 
23 N. Bernard, ‘Discrimination and free movement in EC law’, 45 ICLQ (1996) p. 82. 
24 ECJ, Case 175/78 The Queen v. Vera Ann Saunders [1979] ECR 1129. 
25 Ibid.; ECJ, Case C-108/98 RI-SAN Srl v. Commune di Ischia, Italia Lavoro SpA, 
Ischia Ambiente SpA [1999] ECR I-5219; ECJ, Case C-112/91 Hans Werner v. Finanzamt 
Aachen Innenstadt [1993] ECR 429. 
26 N.N. Shuibhne, ‘Free movement of persons and the wholly internal rule: Time to 
move on?’, 39 CML Rev. (2002) p. 731. 
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was someone at home to look after the children.
27
 Thus Mr. Carpenter, 
a British citizen, living in Britain, was able to rely on EU law to 
circumvent local immigration rules and import his wife, by claiming 
that the British refusal to grant her residence was an obstacle to his 
provision of services in other Member States. The connection with the 
cross-border is clear and real, but it is considerably less substantial 
and persuasive than in the case of a migrant to another state, who may 
argue that he or she is deterred from migrating if he or she cannot take 
the family along. 
One of the most important diminutions of the internal exclusion, both 
in practice and in principle, is the reinstatement of the U-turn 
construction, whereby citizens may go abroad for a period and then 
return to their home state without losing their status as migrants.
28
 
Thus the Frenchman who goes to live in Italy and then returns to 
France continues to enjoy the protection of EU law even after he 
returns home, because his return was also a migration – from Italy to 
France. Hence, he continues to be a member of the protected class.
29
 
This makes it considerably easier for citizens to fall within EU law, 
                                                 
27 ECJ, Case C-60/00 Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2002] ECR I-6279. 
28 See ECJ, Case C-370/90 R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Singh, ex parte 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [1992] ECR I-4265; ECJ, Case C-109/01 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Hacene Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607; ECJ, Case 
C-127/08 Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform [2008] ECR I-6241. 
29 ECJ, Case C-291/05 Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie v. R.N.G. 
Eind [2007] ECR I-10719. 
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and opens the possibility of strategic migration with the ultimate goal 
of returning home under an improved legal regime. For example, 
people may cross the border to study, knowing that when they return 
home they will be able to make Vlassopoulou-like arguments in order 
to gain admission to protected professions, thereby avoiding 
burdensome local qualification procedures. The best-known case 
continues to be Knoors; he went from the Netherlands to Belgium, 
where training as a plumber was more accessible and amenable, and 
then demanded that the Netherlands recognise his qualification and 
allow him to practice when he returned home.
30
 
The Court indicated that such U-turns might be considered an abuse of 
the law, but went on to say that in the particular case no such abuse is 
occurring.
31
 In fact, it adheres far more often to the principle that 
people are entitled to exercise their free movement rights.
32
 Going 
abroad because circumstances are more attractive there is not abuse, 
but is taking advantage of the fundamental freedoms in precisely the 
way that the Treaty intends. By contrast, it often says that doing so 
                                                 
30 ECJ, Case 115/78 Knoors v. Secretary of State for Economic Affairs [1979] ECR 
399. 
31 See e.g. Akrich, supra n. 28; ECJ, Case C-330/07 Jobra Vermögensverwaltungs-
Gesellschaft mbH v. Finanzamt Amstetten Melk Scheibbs[2008] ECR NYP; ECJ, Case C-
403/01 Franca Ninni-Orasche v. Bundesminister für Wissenschaft, Verkehr und Kunst [2003] 
ECR I-13187; ECJ, Case C-110/99 Emsland-Stärke v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [2000] 
ECR I-11569; ECJ, Case C-36/96 Faik Günaydin, Hatice Günaydin, Günes Günaydin and 
Seda Günaydin v. Freistaat Bayern [1997] ECR I-5143; ECJ, Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v. 
Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459; K.E. Sorensen, ‘Abuse of rights in 
Community law: a principle of substance or merely rhetoric?’, 43 CML Rev. (2006) p. 423; A. 
Kjellgren, ‘On the border of abuse – the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice on 
fraud, circumvention and other misuses of Community law’, 11 EBL Rev. (2000) p. 179. 
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purely in order to avoid local legal requirements might be abuse.
33
 Yet 
the burden of proof is on the state, and it is a heavy one: how is it 
possible to show that a person had no motivation other than to 
circumvent the law? After all, even an intention to return does not 
prove this: Mr. Knoors may have always had the intention to practice 
as a plumber in the Netherlands, but simply chose the European 
training course that attracted him the most. This is his free movement 
right. It is hardly surprising that the concept of abuse has remained 
abstract and theoretical. 
The U-turn is at its most controversial and significant where family 
members are involved. A European with a non-European partner 
and/or children has a considerable motivation to migrate, since the EU 
legal regime is more family-friendly than almost any national 
immigration law system. However, the price of an uncomplicated 
family reunion was, for a while, that the citizen must remain a migrant 
in a state other than his home state. Exile was thus the price of 
togetherness. This followed from Akrich, where the Court had said 
that migrants could only bring family members to live with them if 
those family members were already lawfully present within the EU.
34
 
The family rights could be used to take one’s family from Member 
State to Member State, but not to admit them to the EU for the first 
time. This meant that the Dane who moved to Sweden could only rely 
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34 See Akrich, supra n. 28, para. 50. 
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on EU law to bring his or her non-European family to live with him or 
her if the family members were already legally resident in the EU. 
However, if this was the case, then (a) they were almost certainly in 
Denmark, or (b) it would probably not be difficult to bring them to 
Denmark, since intra-European migration is relatively easy. The 
Danes who move to Sweden for family law reasons are precisely those 
whose family members are not yet in the EU, and whom Danish law 
will not admit. Akrich cut these migrants out of EU law, contrary to 
the clear text of the relevant directive but probably in accordance with 
the prevailing political mood. 
In a rare example of an explicit admission that it was wrong, the Court 
has now overturned Akrich on this point, in Metock.
35
 Here it 
reaffirmed that there is no requirement that family members already 
be lawfully within the EU before they fall under EU law. The rules are 
as simple as they seem: a migrant may bring his or her family to live 
with him or her, whatever their nationality.
36
 
This may then be combined with the U-turn principles to create an 
effective way to circumvent national immigration law. The Dane 
spends a period in Sweden, brings his or her family, and then returns 
to Denmark, relying on the fact that he or she continues to be a 
migrant, and so continues to enjoy EU law rights, including family 
                                                 
35 ECJ, Case C-127/08 Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform [2008] ECR I-6241. 
36 See Directive 2004/38, supra n. 2, Art. 7(2). 
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rights. Under a legal regime over which the Danish authorities have no 
control and cannot challenge, the family that Danish law excluded is 
now admitted. 
Once again, it may be argued that this is abuse – and Member States 
always make this argument – but the Court has been reserved and it 
will be in any case difficult to prove. Spending six weeks in another 
state might be pushing one’s luck,
37
 but the migrant prepared to live 
abroad for a year can almost certainly meet any claims of abuse with 
success, and can return home triumphantly, family in tow. 
These cases lead to a socially liberal outcome, where the Court places 
the right of an individual to be with his or her family above the right 
of a community to control entry. EU rights are made accessible to 
more people and in a way that is truly important to those who benefit. 
However, it continues to be a small group that benefits, and the 
divisive effect of free movement is only increased. Uniting foreigners 
with returning expats creates a group that is bigger than either, so that 
the U-turn construction has the effect of enlarging the new 
‘cosmopolitan elite’. Yet the larger this group is, and the more visible, 
the more resentment it will inevitably cause among those outside it. 
This is particularly so where immigration is concerned. The 
resentment of the stay-at-homes is not that they do not have family 
rights – most will not need or want them – but that the immigration 
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laws that they prefer and have chosen via national democracy have 
apparently become optional for all those capable of establishing some 
kind of foreign connection. The more nationally oriented and rooted 
the citizen is – no migration, no foreign family members – the more he 
or she may feel relegated to a lower order of citizenship. This is even 
more so because the U-turn enables some nationals to enjoy EU rights 
as well. The sense of grievance is likely to be greater when members 
of one’s own group are treated better than when privilege belongs 
only to a more intellectually and emotionally distant group of 
foreigners. 
The humiliation of the state 
The cases mentioned above limit the ways in which the state can 
define citizenship and its rights and obligations. For those who 
believed in the old definitions, this must seem like a diminution, or a 
failure, of that state. Salt is rubbed in the wounds by the way that the 
Court requires states to protect the rights in question along with other 
EU rights. The national legal system is treated as a serf, to be ordered 
to comply immediately, without thought for its own needs or logic. In 
principle, Member States have procedural autonomy, and EU law is to 
be absorbed within existing structures. However, there are cases 
where the Court goes beyond ensuring that EU rights are protected, 
and determines how they should be protected. In particular, it has 
effectively declared in a number of cases that national legal systems 
are defective in ways that challenge entrenched national procedural 
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traditions and values. 
One of the most elegant of these cases is Ciola.
38
 This concerned an 
Austrian who owned moorings for yachts on a lake in Austria. A 
decision by the local authorities set a maximum on the number of 
these moorings that could be rented to foreigners, but Mr. Ciola 
ignored this and exceeded the quota. He was prosecuted, and two 
questions were referred to the Court of Justice. One was whether the 
quota was contrary to EU law, and the unsurprising answer was that it 
was. However, the second was whether EU law permitted Mr. Ciola to 
be punished for ignoring the order. The argument of the Austrian 
authorities was that if he believed the order to be wrongful, he should 
have challenged it in court, following the procedures of Austrian 
administrative law. If he had won, the order would have been set aside 
and he could have rented as many moorings as he wanted to 
whomever he liked. However, until the order had been found to be 
unlawful by a judicial authority, it should be treated as binding, and he 
was obliged to respect it. Simply taking a view that it conflicted with 
EU law and therefore ignoring it was more than he was permitted to 
do. 
This is not a strange argument. Most legal systems do not encourage 
self-help. The response to a public act that one objects to is to 
challenge it, not to ignore it. The binding effect of a decision is 
                                                 
38 ECJ, Case C-224/97 Ciola v. Land Vorarlberg [1999] ECR I-2517. 
THE HUMILIATION OF THE STATE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL TACTIC 
 26
independent of its lawfulness. This principle serves the very good 
cause of legal certainty and predictability. The long-term legal 
position may be unclear because one does not know who will finally 
win the challenge, but the immediate legal position is unequivocal: 
while there is a dispute over the validity of the law, the law must in 
general be obeyed. 
EU law is apparently an exception. The Court rejected the Austrian 
government’s standpoint. Saying that the obligation to respect EU law 
applied to all national authorities, it found that a decision or other 
administrative act contrary to EU law could not be applied, and must 
be treated as inapplicable. This meant that the court enforcing Mr. 
Ciola’s fine for disobeying the quota order had to treat that order as 
effectively non-existent. Inevitably this would mean that the fine 
could not be enforced, since there was no ‘applicable’ order that he 
had ignored. 
The ratio of Ciola is therefore that national acts contrary to EU law 
can be ignored with impunity. This encourages risk-taking, as well as 
a contemptuous approach to the state: namely, the system as such 
deserves no respect and its views carry no weight – the only question 
is who is ultimately right. The citizen who is convinced a rule is 
contrary to the Treaty may simply treat it as void without further ado. 
If the citizen is right, she or he will get away with it. If the citizen is 
wrong, she or he can probably expect to be punished with as much 
severity as the authorities can accommodate within the discretion that 
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the law allows them. One can be sure that Mr. Ciola would have a 
better relationship with the local authorities had he waited for the 
ruling dismissing the order before ignoring it. However, he may well 
feel much more independent and assertive now because he 
successfully did not. This is one citizen whose relationship to the state 
has perhaps been changed. 
Ciola is a follow-on in spirit to Simmenthal, as the Court noted.
39
 That 
case concerned an Italian law that was possibly contrary to the Treaty. 
The Italian constitutional court had recently ruled that it was the only 
Italian judicial body competent to set aside national laws, and 
therefore such conflicts should be referred to it by lower judicial 
authorities. If it ruled – perhaps after a reference to the Court of 
Justice – that there was a conflict, it would set the national law aside, 
whereupon the referring judge could decide the case without reference 
to that law, in conformity with EU law. 
A brave lower court judge asked the Court of Justice whether this was 
acceptable, and the Court said no. Every judge or judicial authority 
was bound to apply EU law directly and to set aside conflicting 
national provisions. 
This serves well the cause of maximally effective EU law. The time 
taken for a reference to a national constitutional court, particularly in 
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Italy, is long.
40
 However, it cannot be argued that it is necessary for 
the enforcement of EU rights, unless one maintains that the Italian 
system is in fact inadequate – that the possibility of a reference to the 
constitutional court is theoretical, useless, and denies justice. Since the 
Italian constitutional court had just recently ruled that this is how 
things should work, such an approach would be a remarkable slap in 
the face from the Court of Justice. Moreover, there are presumably 
internal reasons for the Italian system. It was not just EU law conflicts 
that had to be referred. If a local judge considered that a national law 
conflicted with the Italian constitution, it was also obliged to refer 
this. The Constitutional Court had exclusive jurisdiction to set aside 
Italian parliamentary law. 
Such setting aside is indeed a weighty act if one takes parliamentary 
democracy seriously. It is not unusual that some legal systems reserve 
this function for certain judges, while others, such as the British and 
Dutch, have for centuries considered such setting aside to be beyond 
even the highest courts. For the ECJ to intervene in the national 
system and to re-allocate judicial functions in this way, requiring that 
even the lowest administrative decision makers must take a view on 
the compatibility of national and EU law and give preference to the 
latter, is close to allocating to simply anyone the power to set aside 
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[1978] ECR 629. See also ECJ, Case 146/73 Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v. Einfuhr- und 
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national law. A specific judicial function is allocated by the national 
system to a specific group of people, selected with that function in 
mind, but the ECJ decides that any civil servant is in fact capable of 
doing it. After all, many administrative decisions – building permits 
and so on, in fact most administrative decisions – are not taken by 
judges or even by those with legal training. Every public decision-
making body is now a constitutional court. 
The defence is that these lower authorities can if they wish usually 
refer questions to the Court of Justice. However, they are not obliged 
to do so,
41
 and if the national system does not consider them capable 
of judicial review, it looks like misplaced faith to think that they will 
inevitably understand properly when and how to refer. Another 
defence is that there is always the possibility of appeal. But this is a 
slapdash approach to law, and amounts to letting everyone be a judge, 
as long as the highest courts are competent. Legal systems usually try 
to ensure that even the lowest decisions are taken by those properly 
schooled and able, rather than going for quick and cheap justice with 
the possibility of slow and expensive remedies afterwards. 
Not only does the Court of Justice in Simmenthal show contempt for 
                                                 
41 Art. 234 EC provides, with reference to questions of EU law, that:  
…..Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court 
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the coherence of the national system and the logic of its allocation of 
functions but the real and unspoken reason for its decision accentuates 
this. It is widely considered that Supreme Courts have a more hostile 
and fragile relationship with the Court of Justice than do lower judges. 
The top national judge was once at the peak of the judicial pyramid, 
and it is no doubt difficult to accept that others now supervise his or 
her work. Anecdotal evidence suggests that at least in some quarters 
there is a tradition among national Supreme Courts of resisting 
references.
42
 The Court in Simmenthal wanted to break the Italian 
Constitutional Court’s monopoly on EU law issues in Italy, and to co-
opt the much larger and more sympathetic lower judiciary in its cause. 
This is effective from the narrow perspective of achieving the 
immediate goals of EU law. However, it is also once again a 
humiliation of the state, of its highest judicial organ. Judicial review 
of legislation is left to Supreme Courts because it is important, 
difficult, and sensitive, and these are the highest judges. Now the 
Court of Justice allocates part of its function to the lowest ranks of the 
judiciary, implicitly sending the message that Supreme Courts cannot 
entirely be trusted with EU law, and moreover that what they do is 
really not so difficult – lower judges can in fact do it as well. 
This distrust of Supreme Courts is in fact a thread through much of 
EU procedural law, beginning with the Art. 234 preliminary reference 
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system. This allows all judges and tribunals to refer questions to the 
Court of Justice, but with a special provision for judges and tribunals 
against whose decisions there is no appeal – which of course includes 
supreme courts. These latter are required to refer any question of EU 
law that comes before them. The nation’s highest judges are the only 
members of its judiciary that are prohibited from interpreting EU law 
on their own.
43
 The lowest magistrate may interpret a directive, 
consider whether a Treaty article encompasses a given situation, how 
it should be read, what its purpose is, and so on. Supreme courts, by 
contrast, faced with a piece of EU law that might be read in different 
ways, must not address the issue but refer it immediately to 
Luxembourg. 
The reason for the rule is to prevent EU law from being interpreted 
differently in different Member States, and it is true that without the 
reference requirement that risk would be real and would undermine 
the unity and legitimacy of the EU legal system.
44
 However, it could 
have been achieved differently: for instance, by appeal from national 
supreme court decisions to Luxembourg, or by requiring Supreme 
Courts to formulate judgments for approval, or by making references 
                                                 
43 See supra n. 41; G. Davies, ‘Abstractness and concreteness in the preliminary 
reference procedure’, in N. N. Shuibhne, ed., Regulating the Internal Market (Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar 2006) pp. 210-244, also available as The division of powers between the 
European Court of Justice and national courts available at SSRN: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=861824> (accessed 9/11/2009). 
44 See ECJ, Case 66/80 International Chemical Corporation [1981] ECR 1191; T. 
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compulsory if one party requests it.
45
 Yet the appeal path has 
traditionally been seen as even more denigrating to supreme courts, 
since it might involve them being overruled.
46
 Thus a choice has been 
made to effectively cut Supreme Courts out of the European legal 
system.
47
 Rather than risk losing the game, they simply do not play. 
All national judges roll up their sleeves and dig into EU law under the 
guidance of the Court of Justice while the national Supreme Courts 
watch from the sidelines. 
This must undermine the national legal system along with the 
hierarchy and the respect within it. Supreme Courts are not just the 
last word but are the officially declared top experts. Their views and 
words carry weight in the legal world and guide the thoughts of judges 
and practitioners. If they do not participate in the EU law development 
process, they will lose stature, as an area of law develops where most 
national judges are increasingly confident and able, but where 
Supreme Court judges have no experience or track record. 
The system is also being fragmented. Particularly in civil law systems, 
which have no formal doctrine of precedent, the functioning of the 
legal system is said to depend upon the creation of a certain mentality 
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Weiler, eds., The European Court of Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2001) p. 177. 
46 Working Party on the Future of the European Communities’ Court System, Report 
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shared throughout the judiciary.
48
 Judges progress slowly up the 
ladder if their decisions survive the test of appeal, showing that the 
judge has learned to think as his or her superiors do. Yet this 
homogeneity of mindset is surely threatened if there is an area of 
practice and law that lower courts must engage in without guidance 
from the top. The logic of the civilian legal system does not allow 
such an isolation of the supreme judicial authority. 
The preliminary reference procedure is more destabilising than it 
seems. In some ways it reverses the judicial hierarchy, letting lower 
judges become constitutional courts while higher judges must keep 
their silence. The pride attributed to Supreme Courts, which meant 
that back in 1957 it was considered too sensitive to allow them to be 
contradicted, is now extracting its price. 
Nor could it be said that the Court of Justice is trying to alleviate the 
problem. On the one hand, in CILFIT it noted two exceptions to the 
obligation to refer, but so tightly formulated as to be non-existent.
49
 
CILFIT is, on the face of it, more a reaffirmation of the dangers of 
allowing Supreme Courts loose on EU law than a relaxation of the 
                                                                                                                   
47 ‘The Court of Justice has tried by all means to prevent national courts from coming 
to Community maturity’; F. Mancini, ‘The making of a constitution for Europe’, 26 CML Rev, 
(1989) pp. 595 and 606. 
48 M. Lasser, ‘Anticipating three models of judicial control, debate and legitimacy: the 
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Monnet Working Paper 1/03, available at 
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view. On the other hand, in Köbler and Commission v Italy, it was 
emphasised that states could be liable in damages, or fined, for 
failures to refer.
50
 In some ways this could be seen as an implicit 
adaption to the reality that reference will not always occur. However, 
the dominant note in the judgments is simply that Supreme Courts 
must refer and states should pay if they do not. 
The idea of damages for failure to refer raises two issues. On the one 
hand, making the state pay for the actions of its judges challenges the 
division of powers within the constitutional system. How can the 
executive – who will have to pay – be responsible for the actions of a 
body independent of them – the judiciary? The Court’s response to 
this was simply that not permitting state liability would weaken EU 
rights and the effectiveness of the law.
51
 Once again, a classic legal 
constitutional argument is met with one based on a rights-oriented 
policy, and the latter wins easily. Clearly all those constitutional 
sacred cows are a great deal less important than constitutional lawyers 
would have us believe. 
Rather more interesting is the question of how such damages would be 
enforced. Liability for state breaches of EU law is adjudicated by 
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national courts,
52
 so presumably the litigant who was refused a 
reference would have to start again at the bottom of the national 
judicial system. One might expect a lower judge faced with such a 
case to either panic or to refer to the Court of Justice – or both. 
However, there is no obligation to refer, and in principle there is no 
need: the rules governing the obligation to refer are fairly clear, and it 
is simply for a judge to apply them to the facts and decide whether the 
supreme court did in fact have a question of EU law before it, whether 
it ruled wrongly on that, and whether this has caused damage. It is of 
course almost unimaginable that lower courts would rule on their own 
initiative that the supreme court was wrong in law, but this may be 
less of a stumbling block than it seems. The whole issue of damages 
for failure to refer may arise because a subsequent judgment from the 
Court of Justice makes clear that the national Supreme Court was 
wrong. This is what happened in Köbler. Under these circumstances, 
the national judge simply has to decide whether the error was serious 
enough, and whether it caused damage. Thus, the issues in the case 
may well all be applicatory and not interpretative, and so a reference 
may be unnecessary.
53
 In fact, in questions of state liability, the Court 
almost always insists, if sometimes unconvincingly, that it can merely 
explain the principles, but it is for the national judge to decide finally 
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whether there has been a sufficiently serious breach that payment of 
damages is justified.
54
 
The Court thus seems to envisage that lower courts will rule on the 
degree of wrongfulness of higher judicial decisions, and will award 
damages for the actions of their superiors. This is either fanciful or 
radical, depending upon whether the Court seriously expects it to 
happen. One way that it may occur is via the dual legal systems that 
some continental countries enjoy: an administrative court may be 
called to consider whether damages should be paid for a failure to 
refer by the supreme civil court. In that case, reluctance may even turn 
into enthusiasm. 
Like Simmenthal, Köbler is  the motto ‘divide and conquer’ in action. 
All of the above-mentioned cases are Guantanamo-like attempts to 
disorientate the national system to the extent that it concedes; to turn 
national courts upon each other; to reverse the hierarchy; to instruct 
lower judges to judge higher ones; to punish the state for things it 
cannot help; and to encourage citizens to ignore the administration. It 
is all perfectly sensible from an EU law policy perspective, but it is a 
world turned upside down for the traditional constitutionalist, as well 
as for the constitutionally aware citizen. The inability of the state to 
defend itself – and there have been no serious attempts to challenge 
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these doctrines of the Court – is then the final disillusionment. The 
state has been made small. 
4. The right to opt out 
Having elevated the individual and diminished the state, it is a logical 
next step to grant the citizen a right to opt out of his community. This 
is what the Court has done with a number of cases applying the law on 
free movement of services and citizenship to the institutions of the 
welfare state. The cases are at first glance doctrinally orthodox, but a 
closer examination reveals that they are economically and socially 
novel, and even in tension with some of the underlying policy bases 
for the internal market. 
Medical services was the first area of the welfare state to feel the 
liberalising force of EU law, initially in Kohll, where the Court found 
that a Luxembourger had the right to be reimbursed by his medical 
insurer for dental services received in Germany.
55
 The free movement 
of services entailed that recipients of those services could choose to 
obtain them in other states, and measures that impeded such cross-
border provision were in principle prohibited. 
This is not too radical. A rule that an insurer only pays for domestic 
services is largely a rule of administrative convenience. It is easier to 
check quality and legitimacy of documents and services within a state. 
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However, in a straightforward insurance context, where the insurer 
pays for a given service up to a certain amount, there is no 
fundamental reason to be concerned about the nationality or location 
of the provider as such. 
However, the Court has extended the rigours of Art. 56 TFEU beyond 
the commercial sphere to public organisations, most recently in 
Watts.
56
 In this case, a woman was the victim of the British National 
Health Service, a state-funded health service free to residents of the 
UK. The system is based around the separation of payment from 
patients, with the state providing the services free at the point of 
delivery to those in need. This has a certain ideological charm, and 
removes the need for an insurance bureaucracy, with some consequent 
efficiency gains. However, the system also has long waiting lists and 
patients are relatively under-empowered compared with those in an 
insurance-based system, where the patient may usually take his or her 
funding to the provider of choice. 
Mrs. Watts had to wait for a hip operation longer than most doctors 
would consider responsible, but within what was unfortunately the 
norm for the NHS. She asked for permission to have the operation 
abroad, and to have the costs reimbursed by the NHS. This was 
refused, and she appealed, finally obtaining a reference to the Court of 
Justice. 
                                                 
56 ECJ, Case C-372/04 Yvonne Watts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust, Secretary of 
State for Health [2006] ECR I-4325. 
THE HUMILIATION OF THE STATE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL TACTIC 
 39
The Court gave an orthodox answer that was identical to that given in 
earlier cases: a refusal to pay for treatment abroad constitutes a 
restriction on the free movement of services, since it makes it harder 
and less attractive for patients to choose to obtain their remunerated 
medical services from foreign providers.
57
 Mrs. Watts was manifestly 
discouraged from going to the French hospital that had offered, in 
return for payment, to treat her, by the fact that the NHS would not 
cover the costs. Such a restriction on services could be justified by the 
need to protect the stability of the health system under certain 
conditions. It was acceptable to restrict payment for non-system 
treatment to cases where the system could not provide treatment 
without undue delay. The question then was what constituted ‘undue 
delay’, and this must be determined by reference to the patient’s 
circumstances as a whole, not the NHS normal practice, and there 
must be objective guidelines set out and the possibility of appeal to a 
court. 
The importance of Watts is that it confirms an extension of the 
definition of a ‘restriction on the free movement of services’. The 
refusal to pay for foreign treatment comprised such a restriction, even 
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though there was an identical refusal to pay for similarly provided 
national treatment – the NHS would not have paid for Mrs. Watts to 
go to a local private hospital either.
58
 The simple fact that a closed 
health care system had been created – based on free services and no 
payment – was enough to conflict with Art. 56. The NHS is, in its 
very essence, a restriction on the free movement of services. 
Of course on one level this is correct. All closed systems discourage 
exit, and in that sense discourage persons from going to non-system 
providers, including foreign providers.
59
 Free primary school 
education discourages parents from sending their children abroad; if 
the state provided payment vouchers that could be used internationally 
as well as domestically, then more parents might be inclined to send 
their children to schools in other states that demand payment. But 
most parents will not pay for schooling if it is available free at home.
60
 
Similarly, some states subsidise transport for certain groups, such as 
students or pensioners, but only on the domestic transport system. 
This clearly discourages these groups from crossing the border and 
using paid transport services abroad. Why go to the town across the 
border to shop or study or party if you have to pay to get there, while 
transport home from a town in your own state is free? One might go 
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further: some states are generous with subsidies for the renovation of 
old houses, or contribute to rental costs, but only for people living in 
that state. The financially challenged person clearly has a motivation 
to stay in that state, and not to rent or buy a house across the border. 
As long as states exist and collect taxation it will not be possible to 
entirely prevent a certain degree of closure. The logic of the state is 
that citizens, or residents, contribute via taxation and receive via 
services of various kinds. To insist that all services must be provided 
without reference to borders is to render the state incoherent. It breaks 
the link between obligation and benefit, and makes national budget 
control impossible. There is a structural difference here between 
public services provided via a remunerated market mechanism – if the 
state provides subsidy to the consumer, then one might think that the 
consumer may be left free to decide whether to spend it on domestic 
or foreign providers, as in an insurance-based health care system – and 
services provided free – education, policing, libraries. To insist that 
these non-commercial services, which are not provided for 
remuneration, nevertheless comprise an obstacle to the free movement 
of services is to say that the state should offer citizens the option of 
engaging a commercial alternative, including a foreign one – foreign 
surgeon, security services, library service – and be able to send the bill 
to the state. 
This has a dramatic effect on the state, forcing it to rethink its way of 
working. If the NHS cannot be kept closed, it becomes financially 
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vulnerable, and it may be better to move to an insurance-based 
system. Judgments like Watts have a direct liberalising effect,
61
 
although it is simply the first in a chain of consequences. As states 
move away from direct provision of services, society changes in order 
to avoid the financial risks inherent in patients exercising their rights 
to opt out. Welfare services are important for social cohesion, and the 
presence of quasi-monopolies ensures a sort of equality of access and 
provision that is important to national identity and patriotism.
62
 
Collective participation in a huge, benign, non-profit-making care 
organisation contributes significantly to the solidity of a society. 
Fragmenting and privatising leads to a society in which neighbours do 
not share experiences, have different rights and privileges, depending 
on their insurance choices, and do not feel bonds of solidarity and 
obligation.
63
 Institutions matter. 
Moreover, the granting of procedural rights to individuals, which in 
Watts was portrayed as no more than a logical step to ensure the 
effectiveness of Art. 56, accentuates this. It changes the individual-
state relationship and once again makes the NHS vulnerable. Many 
systems are premised on the collective good rather than on individual 
rights. Apparently that is not acceptable. The free movement of 
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services requires non-commercial public services to integrate a rights-
based view of access and to accommodate individual litigation. 
What makes this more than simply a description of the kinds of social 
changes that European integration inevitably brings is the fact that 
nothing in Watts was inevitable. It does not follow naturally from Art. 
56, and is even at odds with some of the premises of that Article. Art. 
56 aims at turning separate national service markets into a single 
European one, with advantages of competition between providers, and 
with the possibilities of economies of scale.
64
 Art. 56 is not concerned 
with the behaviour of non-commercial public service organisations, 
but with the state relationship with businesses, or with state 
intervention in the relationships between businesses, or between 
businesses and their customers. It is a new step to use Art. 56 to grant 
individuals procedural rights against a public organisation like the 
NHS, which is at least arguably itself not part of the internal market,65 
and to require that such non-commercial organisations enter into 
competition with foreign commercial ones. This is not extending 
markets but creating them. Moreover, the economic logic here is 
different. Economies of scale are doubtful, as mergers and 
acquisitions between public organisations are unlikely. Indeed, the 
                                                 
64 See the Spaak Report, Rapport des Chefs de Délégations aux Ministres des Affaires 
Etrangères (Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Conference, Brussels, 21st April 1956), 
discussed in L.W. Gormley, ed., P.J.G. Kapteyn and P. Verloren van Themaat, Introduction to 
the Law of the European Communities 3rd edn. (the Hague, Kluwer Law International 1998) 
pp. 14-15. 
65  See Davies, supra n. 61, pp. 158-167. 
 
THE HUMILIATION OF THE STATE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL TACTIC 
 44
effect of such cases is to reduce the size of providers; no health care 
organisation in the world is as big as the NHS, or enjoys such 
potential for scale economies, and these are reduced by the 
fragmentation that it is undergoing in response to market pressures. 
Further, it is questionable whether effective and efficiency-enhancing 
competition will result; health care services, like other quasi-public 
services, are so riddled with subsidies and distortions that the cost of a 
service is difficult to identify. The price that a recipient pays for a 
health service abroad almost certainly has an unconvincing connection 
with its actual cost. The economic effect of free movement is 
primarily to distort subsidy flows, so that for example Belgian 
taxpayers subsidise British patients who go to Belgium for treatment 
because prices are in fact too low, or British taxpayers subsidise 
Belgian patients because prices are in fact too high. There is a very 
long path of state reform and privatisation to travel before free 
movement will have the simple economic benefits that it may accrue 
in less complicated markets. Watts and cases like it create an 
imperative to travel that path: a little liberalisation creates such 
economic distortions that governments are almost forced to go further. 
None of this can be explained on the basis of Art. 56. The Court says 
that any measure that makes the cross-border provision of services 
less attractive falls within that article, but this is a facile reading.
66
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Almost any measure with financial implications affects the 
attractiveness of foreign purchases. If tax rates go up, one has less to 
spend. If housing prices go up, or sick-pay rates go down, personal 
financial assessments change as a result. The only way to render Art. 
56 as less than a global review of all legislation – which it was clearly 
not intended to be – is to read it more precisely: for example, to detect 
measures that in some sense make foreign service provision 
specifically less attractive than its domestic counterpart.
67
 In Watts 
this was not the case. The simple choice to provide a free service, 
when it could have been provided for payment, was enough to violate 
the article, making it an obligation on the state to extend markets as 
far as possible, rather than an obligation to make them fair and non-
discriminatory where they exist. The difference is that the former does 
not lead to better markets as such, but does lead to a restructuring of 
the state. The right to opt out trumps the collective choice not to make 
certain services part of a commercial market. 
A number of university cases also prize the individual right to opt out 
over economic and social coherence, but this time within the context 
of citizenship rules.
68
 Where Watts applies economic law without 
thought for constitutional or social consequences, these cases apply 
constitutional law – citizenship – without thought for economic 
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coherence. 
The problem that required attention was that of German students 
going to study in Austria, and Dutch students going to study in 
Belgium.
69
 In both cases, large states having restrictive access to 
certain courses of study, or insufficient places, resulted in a significant 
flow of students to universities in smaller neighbouring states. This 
had two major consequences: the smaller states were required to pay 
for the education of their neighbours’ children, since these were 
entitled to the same hugely subsidized fees as local students, and some 
university courses became overfull, resulting in a shortage of places 
for local children wishing to study certain subjects. Austria and 
Belgium both reacted with bureaucratic requirements, which in 
substance made it harder for foreign students to enter their 
universities. 
The Court’s reaction was to dismiss the requirements and to take a 
fatalistic approach to the possible consequences for the higher 
education system. This was simply the consequence of citizenship. 
Students have a right to study anywhere in the EU, without 
discrimination on grounds of nationality. Quotas, which the victim 
states were trying to achieve indirectly, were prohibited, as was 
charging higher fees to foreigners. A university may not distinguish 
according to the origin of its students, at least not if they come from 
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the EU. This is all conventional law.
70
 
Yet an important issue is glossed over in these cases. Higher education 
in Europe is not generally paid for by the students but by the state. 
Student fees vary from being symbolic, in most countries, to being 
inadequate, in the UK, but nowhere do they come close to costs. Who 
has the obligation to pay for these students? Which state should pay? 
One may hypothesise a Europe in which individuals migrate without 
reference to their means, and receive support from the place where 
they live. But it is not the Europe we live in, for two reasons. The first 
is that the sense of community is not yet so profound that one state is 
prepared to receive penniless migrants from another. There is a feeling 
that benefits should be linked to belonging, to membership in some 
sense. This does not have to be nationality – it could be residence for a 
period – but the idea that a poor Greek can move to Sweden with no 
other aim than to receive generous benefits is rejected in society and 
in law; provisions exist that explicitly require migrants to have 
sufficient resources or to be economically active.
71
 The second reason 
is that there is, as in the health case, a deeper logic to this, a 
relationship between rights and obligations. The state supports those 
who support the state by expressing commitment to it: for instance, by 
working there, bearing the passport with the associated obligations, 
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paying tax, or simply living in that country for a period, showing a 
desire to join that society, adding to its social capital. Mere passers-by 
or opportunists do not acquire membership, do not contribute in the 
same way, and arguably should not have the same right to assistance. 
To grant them this is to undermine the contract that the others have 
made with the state, thus taking away their privileges. 
Legally, this challenges the idea that unequal fees would be 
discriminatory. Fees based on residence – the norm in the US, 
between the states – would not be direct discrimination, but would 
only indirectly disadvantage the foreigner, and so are open to 
justification.
72
 The justification would be that support for education is 
the responsibility of the state to the members of its society, not to 
visitors, a matter supported by the legislative restriction of student 
grants to those who have resided in the state for five years.
73
 The 
distinction between this and fee subsidies is analytically trivial, and 
yet the Court holds fast to the idea of equal fees. 
It is a good example of activist intervention in social relationships. 
Equal fees do encourage migration, by making it essentially costless 
for the migrant, and transferring the burden to the host state. It is quite 
right to bring this under EU citizenship, because it is a way of creating 
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a pan-EU community and identity, and probably a reasonably 
effective way. Students are the grown-ups of tomorrow, and mixing 
them will have longer-term effects. Yet this is EU citizenship being 
created at the cost of national citizenship, because the relationship 
between local students and their state is undermined. Not only is there 
a loss of privilege but net recipient states are pushed to either raise 
fees or to cut funding to protect their budgets from migration.
74
 The 
quality of higher education or access to it really is reduced by the 
economic irrationality of demanding equal fees. However, net donor 
states may find that they are losing students with talent and initiative, 
who may be disproportionately among those inclined to seek 
adventure abroad and to search out the best places to study. 
Students are therefore granted a right to opt out of their local 
education system, with benefits for the most mobile individuals and 
disadvantages for the least. The state is encouraged to retreat from 
higher education as much as possible, and the community-forming 
role of educational institutions is diminished. This is EU citizenship in 
competition with national citizenship. 
 
5. The threat of abandonment 
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States increasingly try to protect their social and benefit systems from 
parasitic migrants by imposing residence conditions. Benefits are only 
available to those who have lived in the state for a certain number of 
years. The Court accepts that such conditions are legitimate, if applied 
in a proportionate way. 
However, they may also affect the national citizen, who has 
emigrated. If Jan wants to return from Britain to Holland, he too may 
have to wait for a number of years before he is treated as sufficiently 
integrated into Dutch society to receive all its benefits again. 
The law on this is in a state of transition. It is clear that those who are 
economically active are rarely, if ever, subject to such conditions. 
However, students, job-seekers, and non-economically active migrants 
often are. In Bernini, the Court first took a highly principled position 
on a Dutch rule that restricted study finance to those who had been 
residents for five years.
 75
 This was only acceptable if it applied to 
Dutch citizens as well. Thus the Van Damme’s, who live in Florence, 
would not be able to send their son Jan to study in Leiden and expect 
him to receive study finance unless the same option were open for 
every Italian student too. Since states do not wish to extend such 
expensive benefits to all comers, they prefer to exclude their own 
nationals who have emigrated. 
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In Forster, the Court has retreated from this position, apparently 
ruling that study finance may be subject to a residence period for 
foreigners even if it is not so for nationals.76 This is a rare example of 
the Court allowing national citizens a special privilege in the sphere of 
benefits. Yet the case is probably restricted to the instance of study 
finance, and other cases re-iterate the Bernini position – that the 
national who goes abroad and returns must be treated in the same way 
as the foreigner who arrives for the first time. 
This conceptual step is bigger than any other with regard to non-
discrimination. The first step in equality may be seen as treating the 
foreigner as a national – allowing him or her to join the club. This is 
of considerable practical importance, but is only a limited conceptual 
challenge. Societies may be based on membership, but not many are 
based on the idea that the membership list is closed. Provided a new 
member wishes to join, this does not threaten the foundational 
principles of the club. 
However, it is a step further to say that a national who goes abroad 
must betreated as a foreigner when he or she returns.
77
 This challenges 
the idea of a permanent bond between national and nation, which 
survives wherever the citizen may go.78 For many people, and states, 
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such indestructibility is central to the way national citizenship should 
be understood. Wherever people may live or travel, they should carry 
with them the idea that they could go ‘home’ and immediately be 
taken up into the privileged group, instead of being treated as a new 
immigrant. 
The logic of Bernini therefore makes national citizenship a transitory 
and conditional thing; it is really just a membership of convenience 
tied to actual residence in the state, and the claim to be more than this 
hangs only by the thread of national political participation, the one 
exclusive right that the EU does not take away. This is perhaps the 
most explicit constitutional trade-off between the European and the 
national. The price of enjoying the rights of EU citizenship is directly 
measurable in national citizenship, which sees its substance and value 
made less. 
 
6. Conclusions 
EU citizenship is narcissistic. It severs rights from 
obligations, contributing to a form of individual liberation. Instead of 
the individual adapting to the state, the state is increasingly, where 
migrants are concerned, required to adapt to the individual. In 
rebalancing the state-individual power relationship like this, to the 
detriment of the national order, EU constitutionalism becomes a 
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competitor to rather than a complement of national constitutionalism. 
Attracting support for this notion is based on glorifying the individual 
and humiliating the state. Citizens are bought with attractive rights, 
while their allegiance to the national collective is reduced by 
systematically diminishing the value of its principles of order and 
structure, and by reducing its capacity to treat its own citizens as 
special. 
This is a dangerous tactic, which can result in backlash. In all the 
aforementioned cases, EU allegiance remains fragile and shallow 
when compared with national identity. There is a real risk of 
divergence between documents and public mood, with constitutional 
Treaties being experienced as a rejection of the values and bonds that 
people share, rather than as an embodiment of them. If European 
constitutionalism is to survive, it will not be because it is well 
captured in legal terminology but because European society comes to 
prefer what it offers. 
The essence of the deal is rights for equality. The liberties that EU 
citizenship brings ensure that national societies will consist ever less 
of people who share experiences and institutions, and since different is 
never quite equal, there will be more winners and losers. The question 
is whether the European public will accept this deal. 
A transition from equality-based to rights-based constitutionalism is 
not impossible, and the preference for one or the other of these kinds 
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of society is highly subjective. Both reflect legitimate and traditional 
constitutional values, but order them differently. Yet it is easy for the 
EU to overestimate European readiness to make this transition. It is 
staffed by migrants who are beneficiaries of the new order, the new 
cosmopolitans, and it is an urgent institutional question whether these 
people are still in touch with the stay-at-home outsiders to EU law. 
The emphasis in policy and scholarship on migrants should sound 
alarm bells. EU citizenship may not be zero-sum, but it is not win-win 
either. Piling rights upon rights for the migrant minority, without 
looking at what these rights say and do to the position of the majority 
who live outside the EU legal order, or to the institutions to which 
they feel loyalty, is asking for political unrest in the future. 
